CONTACTS 
0201 - Intel Corporation                    408 765 8080
020101 - Mr. Morris E. Jones; Director of Architecture =408 545 9521
020102 - morris.jones@intel.com

SUBJECTS
Risk Communication Main Factor of Management Success
Mistakes Avoided, Saves Money, Lawsuits
Denial Managers Making Mistakes Reject Savings
Communication Biggest Risk of Mistakes
Traceability & Aligning Communications
Engineering Management Mistakes
Mars Space Probe Crashes
Writing Degraded by Email Internet Information Highway
Faster Better Cheaper Technology Makes Sound Management Practice Poss
TQM Cut Corners Faster Better Cheaper Bumbling
Rework Faster Better Cheaper Takes Longer to Fix Mistakes
TQM Made Practical with SDS Metrics

2614 -    ..
2615 - Summary/Objective
2616 -
261601 - Follow up ref SDS 66 0000, ref SDS 61 0000.
261602 -
261603 - A report published today shows NASA's efforts to use the TQM method of
261604 - working faster, better, cheaper led people to cut corners on good
261605 - management practices, omitting analysis and business metrics, like
261606 - testing.  This has led to continual failures in the Mars exploration
261607 - program.   JPL is calling for mentoring of project managers, and for
261608 - stronger checks and balances.  Senator McCain calls for stronger
261609 - Congressional oversight. ref SDS 0 2278
261610 -
261611 -     [On 000407 listed agenda issue for DKR project meetings.
261612 -     ref SDS 74 6973
261613 -
261614 -
261615 -
261616 -
261617 -
2617 -
2618 -
2619 - Progress
2620 -
262001 -  ..
262002 - Bumbling Caused Another NASA Failure
262003 -
262004 - Reuters reports today that a software glitch, a premature engine
262005 - shutdown and problems with NASA money and management doomed the Mars
262006 - Polar Lander to crash last December. ref OF 1 0001 The space probe was
262007 - supposed to set down gently on the martian surface, landing on its
262008 - three legs; instead, when its legs extended during descent, a false
262009 - signal was generated that made the craft "think" it had already
262010 - landed, and its engines automatically shut off, causing the craft to
262011 - crash, according to an independent review prepared by Thomas Young, a
262012 - former NASA official. ref OF 1 3318
262013 -
262014 - This is the second major failure of the Mars space program.  On 991001
262015 - a $125M space craft crashed on Mars that was supposed to have gone
262016 - into orbit. ref SDS 66 0001  The article today cites the 991001
262017 - failure, and two others to show a systemic problem at NASA.
262018 - ref OF 1 9280
262019 -
262020 - NASA's record is totemic of large organizations and large projects
262021 - that have difficulty using good management consistently, and so are
262022 - susceptible to failure of high risk endeavors that require a greater
262023 - measure of sound management practice, as reported in the record on
262024 - 950327. ref SDS 8 0200
262025 -
262026 -
262027 -  ..
262028 - Analysis Omitted to Save Time, Caused Failure
262029 - NASA Cut Corners on Sound Management Practice - Omitted Analysis
262030 - TQM - Faster, Better, Cheaper Failed to Improve Quality, Reduce Costs
262031 -
262032 - The Young Report cited a core philosophy contributed to NASA's
262033 - failures:  that space missions be made "faster, cheaper and better,"
262034 - FCB for short. This was a departure from the 1980s-vintage large-scale
262035 - programs that took a decade or more to execute. ref OF 1 0550
262036 -
262037 -     The 1980s might not be a good example; the 1986 explosion of the
262038 -     Columbia Space Shuttle showed major flaws in NASA management that
262039 -     led to reforms. ref SDS 3 4499
262040 -
262041 - Faster, Better, Cheaper (FCB) objective pushed NASA to cut corners,
262042 - taking risks in testing, analyses, deviating from engineering and
262043 - management principles, and that's not acceptable. ref OF 1 5625
262044 -
262045 -     Yesterday, Doug Engelbart cited his 1972 paper explaining that
262046 -     technology is needed to improve handling of daily working
262047 -     information. ref SDS 73 3971
262048 -
262049 -     POIMS cites pressure to cut corners caused by limited time is
262050 -     solved by SDS technology that supports analysis, ref OF 9 1054, as
262051 -     a key part of a larger objective for adding "intelligence" to
262052 -     management, ref OF 9 0561, which is not a traditional method of
262053 -     working. ref OF 9 5820
262054 -
262055 -     However, resistance to accomplishing this objective was cited,
262056 -     ref SDS 73 5092, for example...
262057 -
262058 -     On 890324 executives feel SDS is overkill because it impedes
262059 -     deniability. ref SDS 1 6894
262060 -
262061 -     On 911123 Welch Management method using SDS, later Communication
262062 -     Metrics, is different from the way executives like to work by
262063 -     "Feel Good" management that relies on conversation to support
262064 -     deniability. ref SDS 2 1331
262065 -
262066 -     On 940609 Henry Kissinger decries "Alice in Wonderland" management
262067 -     that cuts corners on analysis. ref SDS 4 4238
262068 -
262069 -     On 970910 report executives do not have time to think. ref SDS 23
262070 -     3479
262071 -
262072 -     On 990505 "attitude" prevented using Com Metrics. ref SDS 36 4732
262073 -
262074 -     On 990525 engineers don't like to write up the record, even though
262075 -     this is cited as effective engineering management. ref SDS 38 0966
262076 -
262077 -     On 990527 cultural forces resist adding metrics to management
262078 -     communications. ref SDS 39 1233
262079 -
262080 -     On 990625 CEOs don't like to write up the record. ref SDS 42 7344
262081 -
262082 -
262083 -
262084 -  ..
262085 - Communication Biggest Risk in Enterprise
262086 - Under Funded by 30% Causes Efforts to Expedite That Cause Mistakes
262087 -
262088 - The Mars projects were seen as being under-funded by some 30 percent,
262089 - and aside from money problems, there were not enough people to do the
262090 - work and not enough communication between the key NASA center, the Jet
262091 - Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, and NASA headquarters when problems
262092 - loomed. There was also inadequate communication between the laboratory
262093 - and Lockheed-Martin, the primary contractor for the Mars probes.
262094 - ref OF 1 1147
262095 -
262096 -
262097 -  ..
262098 - US Senate Seeks Accountability; JPL Adding Mentoring and Metrics
262099 -
262100 - "My initial review of the Young Report on the Mars Polar Lander and
262101 - Deep Space 2 missions confirms my belief that NASA senior management
262102 - is missing in action," said Sen. John McCain. ref OF 1 1075
262103 -
262104 - Jet Propulsion Laboratory director Ed Stone said he was creating two
262105 - new offices at JPL, the Space Science Flight Directorate and the Mars
262106 - Program Office, to offer mentoring to project directors and their
262107 - staffs. We have to put in place a system of checks and balances to
262108 - ensure success," ref OF 1 8374
262109 -
262110 -     On 921021 Cal Tech seminar reported a stronger system of controls
262111 -     was developed following the Columbia Space Shuttle explosion in
262112 -     1986. ref SDS 3 4499
262113 -
262114 -
262115 -
262116 -
262117 -
262118 -
262119 -
262120 -
262121 -
262122 -
262123 -
262124 -
262125 -
262126 -
262127 -